Decisions about Decisions  by Yoshida, Wako & Seymour, Ben
Neuron
PreviewsDecisions about DecisionsWako Yoshida1,* and Ben Seymour2,3,*
1Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute International, Kyoto 619-0288, Japan
2Center for Information and Neural Networks, National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Osaka 565-0871, Japan
3Computational and Biological Learning Lab, Department of Engineering, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1PZ, UK
*Correspondence: yoshida@atr.jp (W.Y.), bjs49@cam.ac.uk (B.S.)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2014.01.030
A major puzzle of decision making is how the brain decides which decision system to use at any one time.
In this issue of Neuron, Lee et al. (2014) provide a theoretical, behavioral, and neurobiological account of a
prefrontal reliability-based arbitration system.As sure as there are many ways to skin
a proverbial cat, there are many ways
to solve most real-life decision-making
problems. That the brain has several
different learning and decision systems
at its disposal is no longer disputed but
has given way to a much trickier question:
how do you decide which decision sys-
tem to use at any one time?
In its simplest instantiation, this ‘‘meta-
decision’’ problem can be thought of
as a choice between a computationally
extravagant ‘‘model-based’’ system that
tries to build a full internal model of the
external world, and a frugal ‘‘model-free’’
system that adopts a ‘‘what usually works
well’’ approach. Given that much in the
world is actually rather mundane and pre-
dictable, this latter system of habits will
easily suffice for the majority of the time
(Dolan and Dayan, 2013). The problem is
knowing when it is sufficient and safe to
rely on it.
In 2005, Daw and colleagues presented
the first specific computational account of
how such arbitration might be controlled:
they suggested that as well as outputting
their preference (i.e., values) of possible
actions, each system might also accom-
pany this with an estimate of the uncer-
tainty in these values (Daw et al., 2005).
This uncertainty signal could provide a
normative basis for arbitration, allowing
optimal weighting of the values outputted
by each system to allow an integrated
decision. The Daw model provides a
good account of the existing data in
animals and humans, but it is not particu-
larly easy to test rigorously. Indeed, only
recently have paradigms been developed
that reliably disambiguate different values
produced by each system, and it is not
trivial to refine these paradigms so that468 Neuron 81, February 5, 2014 ª2014 Elsethey also independently vary the uncer-
tainty in these outputs.
In this issue of Neuron, Lee, Shimojo,
and O’Doherty present a comprehensive
theoretical, behavioral, and neurobiolog-
ical analysis of the arbitration problem
(Lee et al., 2014). Their investigation cen-
ters around three central questions. First,
is there a dynamic, flexible process that
arbitrates the respective contributions?
Second, if so, what is the key signal or
signals that each system outputs to an
arbitration module to allow arbitration
decisions to be computed? And third,
how is such a system implemented in
the brain?
Lee et al. (2014) use a combination of
instruction and task complexity to inde-
pendently manipulate values and uncer-
tainties in model-free and model-based
systems. Specifically, subjects engage in
a two-step decision task in which they
make right/left choices to move first to
an intermediate state and second to an
outcome state that yields some amount
of monetary reward signaled by colored
coins. The task is performed under two
conditions: in the first (‘‘flexible’’) condi-
tion, subjects can cash in coins of any
color: this makes the task relatively easy,
indeed easy enough for a model-free sys-
tem, as simply reinforcing action values
workswell. In the second (‘‘specific’’) con-
dition, only coins of a given color can be
cashed, with the others being worthless.
This favors a model-based system, which
can plan the best action by memory of
the particular color of the coins in each
of the outcome states. To further flexibly
manipulate the uncertainty (noting also
that it is still possible that a model-free
learning system could learn the task
with an expanded representation of thevier Inc.initial state), Lee et al. (2014) also manipu-
late the probability that a given action
yields each subsequent state, to be
either high (0.9) or low (0.5). Importantly,
these different state-transition probabili-
ties differentially affect the specific and
flexible conditions and induce a dynamic
variability in uncertainty within a temporal
range detectable with fMRI.
In considering how the balance of con-
trol might shift between systems, Lee
et al. (2014) propose a new model of arbi-
tration (Figure 1), which although similar to
Daw’s uncertainty-based model, has two
important differences. First, to evaluate
the system’s prediction, they used the
reliability, the variance-to-mean ratio of
the probability that the prediction error is
zero at a moment, instead of the variance
per se (uncertainty in Daw et al.) or
the mean of prediction error. Second,
rather than using trial-by-trial reliabilities
to instantaneously determine the relative
contribution of each system, they pro-
pose a dynamical two-state transition
model, in which the reliabilities modulate
the transition rate between choice proba-
bilities of the two systems. This yields a
gradual shift in the reliance on either sys-
tem, as opposed to a knee-jerk depen-
dency. The fact that the habits tend
to emerge with increased training, previ-
ously represented as an exponential
decay (Gla¨scher et al., 2010), was accom-
modated by a bias on the transition rates
so that model-free control is favored if
the reliabilities are equal. In the behavioral
data, model fitting suggests that subjects’
choices seem to better reflect incorpora-
tion of both these differences.
Neurobiologically, they find that reli-
ability signals relating to both systems
have an overlapping representation in an
Figure 1. Schematic Diagram of Arbitration
Themodel-based system learns the structure of state space, including transition probabilities and reward,
whereas the model-free system simply learns action values. Each system outputs a set of action values to
an integrator, and a reliability signal relating to these action values to the arbitrator. Stronger reliabilities
shift the arbitration balance (which has a slight bias toward the model-free system) in favor of that system,
which yields control by flexible inhibition of the model-free system.
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cortex, with this region and a region of
frontopolar cortex correlating best with
the reliability of the more reliable system
at any one time. This suggests that this
region could be involved in subsequent
arbitration computations. Interestingly,
effective connectivity was modulated by
the arbitrator’s output: if the arbitrator
favored the model-based system, there
was increased negative coupling between
the lateral inferior prefrontal cortex and
the putamen (implicated in the model-
free system). This suggests that the reli-
ability-based arbitrator might inhibit
‘‘default’’ model-free system to favor
model-based control rather than control-
ling the two systems symmetrically.
What is appealing about these results
is that they provide a seemingly direct
demonstration of a natural hierarchy in
the control of decision making, with a de-
cision ‘‘metacontroller’’ exerting influence
over ‘‘lower’’ individual decision systems.
This is a self-organizing hierarchy, with
the systems themselves providing the in-
formation that is used by the arbitrator,
so in principle the metacontroller, as the
apical node, does not necessarily require
any additional information—it just dishes
out control in a principled manner. This
makes it the first neurobiological observa-
tion of a complete multisystem decision
process.In addition to suggesting a new role for
the anterior region of the inferior lateral
prefrontal cortex, the results shed light
on the function of the frontal pole—an
area that seems to subserve some of the
most intriguing but obscure functions in
the human brain. Broadly speaking, the
frontopolar cortex appears to compute
relations among internally maintained
contextual representations (of which reli-
ability may be just one type), to contribute
to the flexible updating of behavior
in dynamic environments. Neuroimaging
studies of decision making have shown
responses associated with nonpreferred
options (Koechlin et al., 1999), lesser-
valued exploratory options (Daw et al.,
2006), and ‘‘next best’’ alternatives (Boor-
man et al., 2009). It has also been shown
that activity seems to track the relative
advantages of options within one control
system, i.e., uncertainties of predictions
from model-free (Badre et al., 2012) and
model-based (Yoshida and Ishii, 2006)
systems. However, the current study is
notable as it is the first to demonstrate
reliability-like signals in multiple learning
systems.
As a result, as Lee et al. (2014) specu-
late, this may allow the frontopolar cortex
to supervise the inhibitory control in the
lateral inferior prefrontal cortex as a
‘‘controller of controllers.’’ However, this
still leaves open the question of adaptiveNeuron 81control, i.e., whether this region learns to
control (for example, by building more
abstract representations) or merely imple-
ments control. Both inherently noisy sys-
tems and imperfect or partial observability
make the information from environments
uncertain, but the latter type of uncertainty
can be reduced by belief inference—
a posterior probability over possible
options. In Lee et al. (2014)’s task, for
example, the probabilistic state transition
is systems uncertainty, but there is also
a higher state uncertainty regarding the
existence of the distinct uncertainty con-
ditions (0.5 or 0.9, which is not known
to the subjects). Thus, there is the poten-
tial for more complex, hierarchical infer-
ence-based model representation and
that may have its own distinct uncertainty
signal and influence on the control policy.
The complexity of the decision making
means that the space of subtle differ-
ences in the structure of the model-based
system, input functions, arbitration mech-
anism, and output influence is large.
This creates the opportunity for exten-
sive debate on the precise details of
what is being computed in similar tasks,
which can easily become complicated
by the methodological challenges of fitt-
ing multiple similar models and potentially
codependent parameters. Of course, it
is always easy to make the model more
complicated, but this should detract
from the limpidity and fecundity of the
current exposition.
However, there are some extensions
that are likely to be especially interesting.
For example, how do Pavlovian values
exert competitive control (i.e., during
Pavlovian-instrumental interactions)? Is
there a flexible, parametric influence of
the computational ‘‘effort cost’’ associ-
ated model-based processing (which is
fixed in the current model)? It is also worth
noting that there are other potentially inter-
esting additional ways in which model-
based and model-free systems can
interact. First, it is possible that each sys-
temcould takeadvantageof theprediction
errors generated by the other. Second,
when it comes to choice, themodel-based
system might have access to model-free
values when planning (the model-based
systems’ internal representation might
include the model-free system). Third,
accumulated control by the model-free
system might ultimately inhibit not just, February 5, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 469
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model-based system.
Notwithstanding this, it will be fasci-
nating and illuminating to establish to
what extent these findings will generalize
to other types of task, especially those
that place different demands on internal
representations inherent in the model-
based system. This is important because
almost certainly there are different types
of model-based learning and planning
system: for example, rule- or instruction-
based models (as explored here), model-
based avoidance, partially observable
Markov decision problems (Yoshida and
Ishii, 2006), hierarchical decision-making
problems (Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011),470 Neuron 81, February 5, 2014 ª2014 Elseand navigation (Simon and Daw, 2011).
This puts the onus on other groups to
emulate the sophisticated modeling of
behavior and brain illustrated here.REFERENCES
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